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TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE2
Stating that creating economic development and employment always has
been the best social policy may appear to be a particularly silly statement.
1
However, today – with the Millennium Goals – the world community is
approaching the social problems in the poor countries in a way which in my
view makes this statement highly relevant. The Millennium Goals are noble
goals for a world which sorely needs action to solve pressing social prob-
lems. Compared to how the world has solved problems of poverty over the
last 500 years, however, the Millennium Goals rest upon completely new
principles, the long term effects of which, in my view, are neither well
thought through nor well understood.  In this paper I shall attempt to explain
why I do not think the Millennium Goals represent a good social policy in
the long run.  
The novelty in the Millennium Goal approach lies in the large emphasis on
foreign financing of domestic social goals rather than developing/industrial-
izing countries so they themselves, internally, can solve their own problems
of redistribution. Disaster relief used to be of a temporary nature. Now, with
the disastrous lack of economic development in many countries, disaster
relief finds a more permanent form in the Millennium Goals. In countries
where already more than 50 per cent of the government budget is financed
through foreign aid, huge additional resource transfers are planned. One big
question mark is to what extent this approach will put a large group of
nations permanently ‘on the dole’, a system similar the ‘welfare colonialism’
which will be discussed at the end of the paper. The question is similar to
that of starting foreign wars: what is our exit strategy?  
Several UN Development Decades were only of limited success. In this per-
spective the Millennium Goals may appear as the United Nations institutions
abandoning the project of developing the world’s poor, abandoning the
effort to treat the causes of poverty and instead concentrating on an effort
that to a large extent attacks the symptoms of poverty. In this paper I shall
argue that in my view too much of the development effort has been aban-
doned: to a considerable extent palliative economics has taken the place of
development economics. Indeed the balance of development economics –
radically changing the productive structures of poor countries – and pallia-
tive economics – easing the pains of economic misery – is, in my view, the
key issue, and I think we are planning for a serious imbalance where the
extremely high costs will be much less important than its long term nega-
tive effects. There is little debate around key issues. It is unfortunate that
the Millennium Goals have acquired the proverbial status of motherhood
1  Paper prepared for the High-Level United Nations Development Conference on Millennium
Development Goals, New York, March 14 and 15, 2005. The author wishes to thank Carlota Perez,
Wolfgang Drechsler and Rainer Kattel for critical and constructive comments. The usual disclaimer
applies.and apple pie, institutions that no one in their right mind will speak against.
I shall still make an attempt.
How we used to deal with problems of development.
In spite of a distance of less than one generation, the contrast between the
type of economic understanding behind the Marshall Plan on the one hand,
and the type of economic theory behind today’s multilateral development
discourse and the Washington Institutions on the other hand, is abysmal.
The Marshall Plan grew out of recognition of the poverty and misery caused
by its forerunner, The Morgenthau Plan, in Germany. While the goal of the
Morgenthau Plan was to de-industrialize Germany (to prevent further wars),
the goal of the Marshall Plan was to re-industrialize not only Germany, but
to establish a cordon sanitaire of wealthy nations along the borders of the
communist block in Europe and Asia, from Norway to Japan.
In terms of the number of nations and number of people lifted into relative
wealth, this re-industrialization plan was probably the most successful
development project in human history. The fundamental insight behind the
Marshall Plan was that economic activities were qualitatively different,
those of the countryside (which we could call diminishing returns activities,
or agriculture and raw materials) differed from those of the cities (which we
could call increasing returns activities, or industry). In his famous June
1947 speech at Harvard, US Secretary of State George Marshall (who was
later to be awarded the Nobel Peace Price) stressed that ‘the farmer has
always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the
other necessities of life’. This division of labour, i.e. between increasing
returns activities in the cities and the diminishing returns activities in the
countryside, was ‘at the present time…threatened with breakdown’. He
then made a remarkable recognition of the cameralist and mercantilist eco-
nomic policy of previous centuries: ‘This division of labor is the basis of
modern civilization’. Civilisation requires increasing returns activities, some-
thing that economists and politicians from Antonio Serra (1613) to
Alexander Hamilton, Abraham Lincoln and Friedrich List had already been
saying for a long time. The principles behind the toolbox used by nations
going from poverty to wealth through the creation of ‘city activities’
(Appendix 1) have been surprisingly stable from they were first used by
Henry VII of England starting in 1485 until their use in Korea in the 1970s.
I claim that many of today’s problems are due to the conditionalities of the
Washington Institutions classifying the toolbox needed to create increasing
returns activities – a toolbox employed by all countries that developed after
Venice and Holland – as ‘illegal activities’.     
After World War II, the toolbox did not produce the same success in every
country. The most successful countries temporarily protected new tech-
3nologies for the world market under competition (e.g. Korea). The least suc-
cessful permanently protected mature technologies for often small home
markets under limited or no competition (typically the small countries of
Latin America). From Mongolia to Russia and Peru, however, the key fact
is that this inefficient industrial sector produced higher real wages than
these same countries enjoy today when this structure has been consider-
able weakened
2 (See figure 1). For centuries it was understood that having
an ‘inefficient’ industrial (increasing returns) sector produced higher real
wages than no industrial sector at all, and that this ‘business inefficient’
sector ought to be made more efficient rather than being closed down.  
In its most simple form this argument is born out of the inclusion of both
increasing and diminishing returns in trade theory, as the starting points
respectively of virtuous and vicious circles of growth or poverty. A praxis
ignoring these mechanisms may cause factor price polarization rather than
factor prize equalization. Increasing returns, virtuous circles, and large eco-
nomic diversity were first established as necessary elements for wealth by
Serra (1613), who specifically says these mechanisms are not available in
the agricultural sector. The principle thus created was understood almost
continuously – with brief interruptions – up until and including the Marshall
Plan, but was in practice abandoned with the Washington Consensus.
Deindustrialisation used to be something one would impose on a van-
quished enemy, like on France after the Napoleonic War. Since the 1980s,
‘structural adjustment’ produced this same effect in many poor countries.
Ruling theory at the time said this would not matter, to the contrary, a free
trade shock would – in the vision of first WTO Secretary General, Renato
Ruggieri – unleash ‘the borderless economy’s potential to equalise relations
between countries and regions’.   
In the 1930s, placing the gold standard (Keynes’ ‘barbarous relic’) and
budget balances as the untouchable core of economic theory and practice
locked the world into a sub-optimal equilibrium, for a long time preventing
Keynes’ policies to be carried out with the approval of mainstream eco-
nomics. In a similar way, placing free trade as the ideological centrepiece
of development policies – to which all other goals become subservient –
since the fall of the Berlin Wall has locked the non-industrialized countries
into a very sub-optimal equilibrium. In my view, rather than continuing
world policies based on the most simplistic version of mainstream trade the-
ory, we must again take the conflict between free trade and real wages in
non-industrialised countries seriously. A specialisation in diminishing returns
4
2 This analysis is complicated by the fact that wages and the income of the self-employed as a per-
centage of GDP are falling in most countries, whereas the FIRE sector (finance, insurance, real state)
increases. In Norway this wage/self employed share of GDP has been close to 70 per cent, in Peru
it was around 23 per cent when the national statistical office stopped publishing this figure in 1990.activities with increasing population pressures also has serious environ-
mental consequences.
3         
In my opinion the poverty we can observe in so many countries in the Third
and former Second World is not caused by transitory problems, but by per-
manent features of nations having different economic structures. When the
US started industrialising, few (although some) had the ambition for the
country to be as wealthy as England. They just wanted to create a less effi-
cient copy of the kind of production structure they could observe in England.
This required tariffs. Successful industrialisation under protection, however,
carries the seeds of its own destruction. By the 1880s US economists –
using the same arguments based on scale and technology that were used
to protect US industries in the 1820s – now argued for free trade. The same
tariff that for a while created manufacturing industry, was now hurting the
same industry.
4 This is why List, the protectionist, was also an early vision-
ary of global free trade: when all countries had achieved a comparative
advantage outside the diminishing returns sector.
5 The disagreement is not
over the principle of free trade as such, only over its timing.
If one, instead of accepting Adam Smith as an icon of free trade and lais-
sez faire under any circumstances, reads what he says about economic
development at an early stage, one will find that he is very much in line with
classical development economics, where industrialization is the key recom-
mendation. In his early work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith
1759/1810), Adam Smith argued passionately for ‘the great system of gov-
ernment’ which is helped by adding new manufactures. Interestingly, Smith
argued that new manufactures are to be promoted, neither to help suppli-
ers nor to help consumers, but in order to improve this ‘great system of
government’.
In fact, it is possible to argue that Adam Smith was also a misunderstood
mercantilist, someone who firmly supported the mercantilist policies of the
past, but then argued that they were no longer necessary for England. In
other words, Adam Smith played the same role later played by Schoenhof
(see above, footnote 3) in the United States. He praises the Navigation Acts
5
3 Reinert, Erik S. ‘Diminishing Returns and Economic Sustainability: The dilemma of resource-based
economies under a free trade regime.’ Published in Hansen, Stein, Jan Hesselberg and Helge Hveem
(Eds.),  International Trade Regulation, National Development Strategies and the Environment:
Towards Sustainable Development?, Oslo, Centre for Development and the Environment, University
of Oslo, 1996.
4 Schoenhof, J. The destructive influence of the Tariff upon Manufacture and Commerce and the
figures and facts relating thereto.  New York, published for the New York Free Trade Club, 1883.
5 Reinert, Erik ‘Raw Materials in the History of Economic Policy; or, Why List (the Protectionist) and
Cobden (the Free Trader) Both Agreed on Free Trade in Corn.’, in Parry, G. (editor), Freedom and
Trade. 1846-1996. London, Routledge, 1998.protecting English manufacturing and shipping against Holland, arguing
‘they are as wise… as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate
wisdom’ and holding them to be ‘perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial
regulations of England’ (Smith 1776/1976: I, 486-487). All in all, Smith
described a development that had become successfully self-sustained, a
kind of snowballing effect, originating in the wise protectionist measures of
the past. Only once did Smith use the term ‘invisible hand’ in the Wealth of
Nations: when it sustained the key import substitution goal of mercantilist
policies, when the consumer preferred domestic industry to foreign industry
(Smith 1776/1976: 477). This is when ‘the market’ had taken over the role
previously played by protective measures, and national manufacturing no
longer needed such protection. If one cared to look, Adam Smith also argued
for tariff protection at an early stage as a mandatory passage point to devel-
opment as did Friedrich List. Studying economic policy without discussing
its context is one of the destructive vices of present economic practice.  
The praxis of economic development has been to assimilate and produce
less efficient ‘copies’ of the economic structure of wealthy nations. The key
features of the economic structure of wealthy nations have been a large
division of labour (a large number of different industries and professions),
an important increasing returns sector (industry and today also knowl-
edge–intensive services). This understanding was made into economic the-
ory by economists who codified what actually took place in wealthy coun-
tries: Antonio Serra (1613), James Steuart (1767), Alexander Hamilton
(1791) and Friedrich List (1841). These principles are at times unlearned
when the natural harmony of physics-based economics totally takes over,
as in France in the 1760s, in Europe in the 1840s, and in the world in the
1990s. These periods come to an end because of their great social costs.
Physiocracy in France created shortages and scarcity of bread, and started
the process that led to the French revolution.
6 The free trade euphoria of
the 1840s met its backlash in 1848 with revolutions in all large European
countries, with the exception of England and Russia. Ricardo’s trade theo-
ry is proven wrong every time it is applied asymmetrically to increasing and
diminishing return industries
7, Ricardo is proven right that the ‘natural’
wage level is subsistence. The free trade euphoria of the 1990s has again
backlashed and created widespread poverty, but this time our response is
wrong. We are focusing too much on the symptoms rather than the caus-
es of the problem.         
6
6 See the works of Steven Kaplan, e.g. The Bakers of Paris and the Bread Question, 1700-1775,
Durham, Duke University Press, 1996.
7 This asymmetry is the core of the argument in Frank Graham’s 1923 article, a basis for Krugman’s
New Trade Theory.The situation today. 
Today’s standard economics tends to see development as largely being
driven by accumulation, by investments in capital physical and human.
8
Standard economic theory which underlies today’s development policies is
generally unable to recognise qualitative differences between economic
activities. I have argued elsewhere that globalization in the periphery there-
fore has had the effect of a Morgenthau Plan in many of the world’s small
and poor countries: ‘removing the basis of modern civilization’. If we look
at the list of today’s failed or failing nations, we will find that they all fail
George Marshall’s test for what creates modern civilisation: They have very
weak manufacturing sectors, unable to create the virtuous exchange
between city activities and countryside activities that Marshall recognised.
They also have a very limited diversity in their economic base, a very limit-
ed division of labour, and are specialised in diminishing returns activities. 
Historically, modern democracy was born in the nations where the civilising
trade between urban and rural areas had already been established, as in the
Italian city states. A key feature of the most successful city states was that
power was not in the hands of the landowning (diminishing returns) class.
The scarcity of arable land made this easy in Venice and The Dutch Republic,
and the fact that the few islands of wealth in Europe also geographically
tended to be islands was not lost on the early economists. In other areas this
was only achieved through constant political struggle. In Florence, 40-odd
landowning families had been banned from political life already in the 13th
century, enabling what we later in this paper shall call Schumpeterian crony-
ism: political and economic interests ‘colluded’ in a way that created wide-
spread wealth. Dependency on raw materials would create feudalism and/or
colonialism, neither of these situations leading to political freedom. If we
wish to establish genuine democracies, we may also here at the moment be
starting at the wrong end of the problem, attacking symptoms rather than
real causes of political freedom. The US Civil War was essentially a war
between landowners with vested interest in agriculture and cheap labour
(the South) and those with a vested interest in industrialization what the
most visionary of the 19th century US economists called ‘a high wage strat-
egy’ (the North). The history of Latin America is in many ways the history
of a group of countries where the South won the Civil War. 
The alternative paradigm, which we could broadly call evolutionary and his-
torical – which I refer to as The Other Canon of economics – the key force
in development is assimilation: learning to do what more advanced coun-
7
8 This discussion builds on a recent paper by Richard Nelson, ‘'Economic Development From the
Perspective of Evolutionary Economic Theory’', The Other Canon/Tallinn University of Technology
Working Papers on Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics, No 2, January 2006.tries are doing, ‘copying’ not only their institutions, but more importantly
their economic structure.
9 In fact institutions like patents and protection,
scientific academies and universities, were key elements in the strategy to
change national economic structures in order to assimilate that of the
wealthier countries. In this tradition, economic growth tends to be activity-
specific, tied to clusters of certain economic activities exhibiting increasing
returns and rapid technological progress. This process requires capital, but
the difficulty lies in transferring and mastering the skills and, above all, in
creating a viable market for the increasing returns activities in nations where
the absence of purchasing power and massive unemployment tend to go
hand in hand, each factor reinforcing the other in a deadlock. By generally
insisting on using models assuming full employment, the Washington
Institutions avoid facing a key factor in the mechanisms that lock nations
into poverty: the lack of formal employment. Historically, since 16th centu-
ry Holland and Venice, only nations with a healthy manufacturing sector
have achieved anything close to full employment combined with a lack of
sizable rural underemployment.    
Today’s reigning economic theory represents what Schumpeter called ‘the
pedestrian view that it is capital per se that propels the capitalist engine’:
development is seen as largely driven by the accumulation of capital, phys-
ical or human. ‘The premise of neo-classical theory is that, if the invest-
ments are made, the acquisition and mastery of new ways of doing things
is relatively easy, even automatic’, as Richard Nelson says. Even more
important, the core thesis of standard economics, albeit seldom expressed,
is that economic structure is irrelevant, capital per se will lead to econom-
ic development regardless of the economic structure into which the invest-
ment is made. In the alternative Other Canon theory, economic activities
exhibit very different windows of opportunity as carriers of economic
growth. An intuitive example: Bill Gates is not likely to have achieved his
present economic success specializing in herding goats or growing broccoli:
the technological wave that created Microsoft is not replicable in a compa-
ny or country specialising in goat herding or growing broccoli. In other
words we have to get rid of what James Buchanan calls ‘the equality
assumption’ in economic theory, probably the most important and the least
discussed assumption.
10 The ability to absorb innovations and new knowl-
8
9 Historical evidence for this practice in the European theatre is found in my paper ‘Benchmarking
Success: The Dutch Republic (1500-1750) as seen by Contemporary European Economists’, in How
Rich Nations got Rich. Essays in the History of Economic Policy. Working Paper Nr. 1, 2004, SUM
- Centre for development and the Environment, University of Oslo. Downloadable on
http://www.sum.uio.no/publications
10 At its core, the Enlightenment project was one of ordering the world by creating taxonomies or
classification systems, of which that of Linnaeus is the best known. Neo-classical economics
achieves its analytical accuracy precisely because it lacks any taxonomy: everything is qualitatively
alike. Therefore its conclusions, like factor-price equalization, are essentially already built into the
assumptions.edge – and consequently profitably to absorb investments – at any time
varies enormously from one economic activity to another.
The problem: As a result of seeing capital per se as the key to 
growth, loans are given to poor nations which their productive/ 
industrial structure is unable to absorb profitably. Interest payments
will often very fast exceed the rate of return on the investments 
made. ‘Finance for Development’ may therefore take on the char-
acteristics of a pyramid game or a chain letter fraud: the only ones
to gain are those who started the scheme and are close to the 
door.
11 Correspondingly on the human side: Investments in human
capital are made without corresponding change in the productive 
structure that creates a demand for the skills acquired. As a result
education may tend only to promote emigration. In both cases 
Gunnar Myrdal’s ‘perverse back washes’ of economic development
will be the result: more capital – both monetary and human – will 
flow from the poor to the rich countries than the ther way around.
My claim, based on the study of 500 years of history’s laboratory,
is that the main explanation for this lies in the type of economic 
structure – locked into a vicious circle of lack of supply and lack of
demand and the absence of increasing returns – that characterises
poor nations. This circle cannot possibly be broken unless we again
listen to 500 years who speak in favour of the set of policies listed
in Appendix 1. Abraham Lincoln stands out as a proud representa-
tive of this type of national economic strategy, and US industrial 
policy from 1820 until 1900 is the best example for the Third World
to follow today until – as the US was towards the end of the 19th
century – these nations are ready to participate fully in and benefit
truly from international trade.     
Recommendation: As was the case with the Marshall Plan, financial
funds must be matched with the establishment of industrial and 
service sectors that profitably can absorb both the physical and 
human investments. A diversification out of raw material production
is absolutely indispensable in order to create a basis both for dem-
ocratic stability and increased welfare. Initially these sectors will not
be able to survive world market competition. As this process always
has required, since England’s ascent to industrialization starting in 
1485, this incipient industrialisation needs special treatment of the
kind the Marshall Plan afforded after 1947. This requires interpret-
ing the Bretton Woods agreement as it was done in the post-WW II
era, not as it is presently interpreted.         
9
11 See Kregel, Jan, ‘External Financing for Development and International Financial Stability, UNC-
TAD G-24 Discussion Paper Series , No. 32, October 2004. Downloadable at www.unctad.orgPart of the problem also lies in neo-classical economics’ poor understand-
ing of successful business. It is almost curiously amusing that at the core
of the economic theory behind capitalism is a situation of perfect competi-
tion and equilibrium, a situation where no one makes any money to speak
of. In standard economics successful businessmen like Bill Boeing and Bill
Gates – who both contributed importantly to the wealth of Seattle – are
‘rent-seekers’, generally an odious term. In fact it is the poverty-stricken
Third World that most closely corresponds to the conditions assumed in
international trade theory, diminishing returns and perfect competition. The
rich countries, whose export items are produced under Schumpeterian
dynamic imperfect competition, are ‘rent seekers’ whose rents, spreading
through society as higher wages and a higher tax base, are what we call
‘economic development’. This failure to understand development as
Schumpeterian imperfect competition is at the root of the present argu-
ments against an industrial policy. Anything which causes imperfect com-
petition tends to be seen as ‘cronyism’. 
Keynes saw investments resulting from what he called ‘animal spirits’.
Without this ‘animal spirit’ – without the initiative to invest in uncertain con-
ditions – capital is sterile, both in the world of Joseph Schumpeter and in
that of Karl Marx, each representing one side of the political spectrum. The
motivating force behind this animal spirit is to make profits, to break the
equilibrium of perfect competition. From this businessman’s point of view
the very simple explanation for the lack of investments in poor countries is
the lack of profit opportunities. He does not invest because he sees no
opportunity to make profits outside the extraction of raw materials. This
lack of opportunities for profitable investments is largely tied to the
extremely low purchasing power and the very high unemployment rate.
Subsistence farmers do not represent profitable customers for most pro-
ducers of goods and services. Tariffs create incentives to move production
into the labour markets of the poor. Historically, this has been seen as a
conscious tradeoff between the interest of man-the-consumer and man-the-
producer. The idea that industrialization would cause a rapid increase in
employment and wages that more than offset the temporary higher cost of
manufactured goods was at the core of the Prebisch import-substitution
industrialization, but also of US economic theory around 1820.
12    
The idea that greater ‘openness’ in any way should improve the situation
of the poor countries is both counterintuitive and contrary to historical expe-
rience. If anything, the first effect of sudden ‘openness’ in a backward soci-
ety is likely to kill off what little manufacturing activity that might exist,
10
12 See e.g. Raymond, Daniel, Thoughts on political economy, Baltimore, Fielding Lucas, 1820.making the situation worse.
13 In effect historical experience shows that
opening up for free trade between nations of very different levels of devel-
opment tends first to destroy the most efficient industries in the least effi-
cient countries (The Vanek-Reinert Effect), from the unification of Italy in
the 19th century to the integration of Mongolia and Peru in the 1990s.
Figure 1 visualizes how the highly successful export increases that followed
the opening up of the Peruvian economy were accompanied by falling real
wages. In Peru, as in many other Latin American countries, real wages
peaked during the period of ‘inefficient’ import substitution. The ports, air-
ports, roads, power stations, schools, hospitals, and service industries that
were created by this inefficient industrial sector, led by rent-seekers, were
real and could not have been created without the demand for labour and
infrastructure that this inefficient industrial sector generated.
14 Economic
theory must again open up to understanding synergies of this type, where
temporary ‘business inefficiency’ in certain sectors activates more efficient
activities and/or the upgrading of human capital in other sectors, in the end
leading to increased welfare.  
The timing of the opening of an economy is crucial. Opening up the econ-
omy too late will seriously hamper growth. Opening up an economy too
early results in de-industrialization, falling wages
15 and increasing social
problems. An anonymous traveler who in 1786 observes the effects of eco-
nomic policy in different European countries reaches this same conclusion:
‘Tariffs are as harmful to a country after the arts [manufacturing industry]
have  been established there, as they are useful to it in order to introduce
them’.
16
In Southern Mexico we can observe the destructive sequence of de-indus-
trialization, de-agriculturalization
17 and de-population. That large numbers of
subsistence farmers should be made ‘uncompetitive’ by subsidized First
World agriculture is a relatively new, but alarming, trend that may persist
even if the subsidies are removed. There are around 650 million farmers in
India, and a large proportion of them are as ‘uncompetetive’ as their
11
13  I have showed this effect in ‘Globalisation in the Periphery as a Morgenthau Plan: The
Underdevelopment of Mongolia in the 1990s’, in Reinert, Erik (editor), Globalization, Economic
Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004. See also
my paper ‘Increasing Poverty in a Globalised World: Marshall Plans and  Morgenthau Plans as
Mechanisms of Polarisation of World Incomes’, in Chang, Ha-Joon (editor), Rethinking Economic
Development, London, Anthem, 2003. 
14 I am grateful to Carlota Perez for having formulated this insight.
15 But not necessarily falling GDP/capita. See footnote 1. 
16 Anonymous (1786). Relazione di una scorsa per varie provincie d’Europa del M. M.... a Madama
G.. in Parigi. Pavia: Nella Stamperia del R. Im. Monastero di S. Salvatore. p. 31. I am grateful to
Sophus Reinert for this reference.
17 As imported and subsidized US food takes over from local maize and wheat production.Mexican colleagues if and when free trade opens up, but without the pos-
sibility to migrate to the US. In the poorest countries today a tradeoff exists
between maximizing international trade – which is what present policies
achieve – and maximizing human welfare (Figure 1). In my view we must
address this tradeoff in a different way than trying to compensate the loss-
es of the poor countries through increased aid.       
More than five centuries of history – from England’s ascent starting in 1485
– show that there is only one point where the complex deadlock of vicious
circles of poverty and underdevelopment can effectively be attacked: by
changing the productive structure of the poor and failing states. This means
increasing diversification away from the diminishing returns sectors (tradi-
tional raw materials and agriculture) into an increasing returns sector (tech-
nology intensive manufacturing and services), creating a large division of
labour and the synergies and social structures which emerge from this
structure. This is also the only way to make it possible for subsistence agri-
culture to break away from its chains: creating an urban market for their
goods, which will induce specialization and innovation, bring in new tech-
nologies and create alternative employment. Foreign markets cannot play
the same role, they break economies into advanced and backward sectors
and regions: the key to cohesive development is an interplay between
increasing and diminishing returns sectors in the same labour market.    
The arguments against industrial policy: Malthusian vs. Schumpeterian
cronyism.  
2005: A Filipino sugar producer uses his political influence in order to
achieve import protection for his products. 
2000: Major Daley in Chicago does not listen to the Chicago economists,
but provides subsidies to already wealthy high-tech investors through an
incubator. 
1950s and 1960s: Swedish industrialist Marcus Wallenberg uses his close
political contacts with Labour Party Minister of Finance, Gunnar Sträng, to
achieve political support and favours in order to carry out his plans for com-
panies Volvo and Electrolux. 
1877: Steel producers in the United States use their political clout to
achieve a 100 per cent duty on steel rails.
18 
12
18 Taussig, F.W. The Tariff History of the United State, New York, Putnam’s, 1897, page 222.1485: Woolworkers use their political connections to King Henry VII in
order to achieve subsidies and an export duty on raw wool that will increase
the raw material prices for their competitors on the Continent, slowly killing
the wool industry elsewhere, e.g. in Florence.     
These are all blatant examples of crony capitalism, very far from the nice
perfect level playing field we are all supposed to prefer. These are all rent
seekers that purist economic theory tends to abhor. There is, however, a
crucial difference between the first example and the rest. The Filipino crony
differs from the other cronies in that he gets subsidies in a diminishing
return raw material that competes under perfect competition on the world
market. He is a Malthusian crony leading his country down the path of
diminishing returns (in spite of technological change which counteracts
this). The others are Schumpeterian cronies, producing under what
Schumpeter calls historical increasing returns (a combination of both
increasing returns and fast technological change). If we couple this to trade
theory we see that the tilted playing fields providing Schumpeterian crony-
ism produce widely different results than those of the Filipino crony.    
Bismarck used to say that there are two things whose production process
one should better not watch: sausages and government budgets. We
should probably add industrial policy to this group of aesthetically unpleas-
ant production processes. We can live without sausages, but not without
government budgets or industrial policy. And, as Keynes said, ‘the worse
the situation, the less laissez-faire works’. If we insist that we cannot have
industrial policy because moving away from perfect competition will cause
some cronies to get rich, we have totally misunderstood the nature of cap-
italism. Capitalism is about getting away from perfect competition; this is
what people spend years at business schools learning.  
Economic development is caused by structural change which breaks equi-
librium creating rents. Insisting on the absence of rents is insisting on a
steady and stationary state. This is the reason why tariffs in many ways
are the least crony-friendly of the policy tools. However, there is still the
need to choose which activities to protect, which almost by definition will
create cronies. Abraham Lincoln protected the steel cronies, and he was
very proud of it. He saw that by paying a little more for steel
19, he man-
aged to create a huge steel industry with many jobs paying high wages that
also provided a base for government taxation. Economic development strat-
egy is about getting the public interests of the nation lined up with the pri-
vate vested interests of the capitalists. As stated above, the failure of stan-
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19 That the steel tariff later got as high as 100 per cent, was a result of technological change and
rapidly falling prices in a situation where the tariff was not based on value, but determined in dollars
per ton.  dard economics to understand the dynamics of the world of business is a
serious problem. This also leads to a failure to understand the economic
essence of colonialism. At its economic core colonialism is a technology
policy: the colonies were not allowed to have manufacturing industries. The
economic activities with high potential for economic growth and mecha-
nization were to remain in the metropolis, the diminishing returns activities
went to the colonies. 
The immense transfers that accompany The Millennium Goals process will
necessarily also lead to cronyism. Some people will get wealthy through
this initiative, and a huge aid industry-cum-lobby is working very actively.
Crony-free economics only exists in neo-classical models. My choice is that
we go for Schumpeterian cronyism more than aid-based cronyism, because
in this way we also make it possible for the poor countries to free them-
selves from economic dependency. Is it because the apparent motivation of
the businessman is greed and avarice, while the apparent motivation of the
aid lobby is charity that the presently preferred solution tilts so heavily in
favour of charity rather than development? Again we may have unlearned
our basic Adam Smith: it is not by the charity of the baker, but by his greed
that we get our daily bread.    
We also seem to have unlearned the logic behind policy tools for econom-
ic development. Patents and modern tariffs were created at about the same
time, in the late 1400s. It is crucial to understand that these rent-seeking
institutions were created by the very same understanding of the process of
economic development. To create protection and rents in order to produce
new knowledge (in the case of patents) and to make it possible to move
the new knowledge in order to produce with this new knowledge in new
geographic areas (the case of tariffs) are two aspects of the same under-
standing of Schumpeterian economic dynamics. From the point of view of
those who think that perfect competition is the ideal economic situation,
both patents and tariffs represent legalized rent seeking in order to promote
goals that are not achievable under perfect competition.  
I suggest looking at this set of problems as the poor countries might look
at them. Why is the rent seeking and crony argument not applied also
against patents, only against tariffs and other policy instruments used in
poor countries? Why does the economic profession accept legalized rent-
seeking by pharmaceutical companies and by Bill Gates, but abhor the rent-
seeking of an industrialist who tries to set up a small business in Lima,
Peru? The poor countries may, with some justification, say that the wealthy
countries are establishing rules that legalize constructive rent seeking in
their own countries, but prohibit them in the poor countries. Over time
industrialization has proved as beneficial to mankind as many highly pro-
tected drugs.   
14The Washington Consensus and sequential single issue management.
By the time of what The New Yorker appropriately called the ‘triumphalism’
following the fall of the Berlin Wall, neo-classical economics with its varia-
tions had become the only game in town. The logic of the post-WW II years
that had built wealth along the belt bordering communism, from Norway to
Japan, was gone, and economics had fossilized into a war between two
utopias: the communist utopia that promised that each should give accord-
ing to ability and receive according to need, and the neo-classical utopia
that promised that under capitalism everyone would receive the same
wages world-wide (Paul Samuelson’s factor-price equalization). Both of
these theories, the communist planned economy and neo-classical eco-
nomics, were based on David Ricardo’s theories (1817). Ricardo and his
successors show a disregard for economic structure, for technology and
innovations, for entrepreneurship and leadership, and for the fact that eco-
nomic activities are qualitatively different as carriers of economic welfare.
In both its communist and its liberalist forms Ricardian economics sees no
need for a state (Marx’ ‘withering away of the State’). 
However, neo-classical economics was, to use Nicholas Kaldor’s term, an
un-tested theory. Neo-classical theory had provided an effective ideological
shield during the Cold War, but no nation had ever been built on this type
of theoretical framework. In its most extreme form, as it was practiced
around 1990, the only predicament was that nations should ‘get their prices
right’ and economic growth would follow automatically, disregarding eco-
nomic structures. Because it is so counterintuitive (why should bioengineers
and shoe-shine boys get the same wages just by being put in different
nations??), Paul Samuelson’s theory of factor-price equalization had long
not been the pride of the economics profession. Now, by 1990, policy rec-
ommendations were formulated as if this ‘law’ of factor-price equalization
was comparable to the law of gravity. This neglected not only important
theoretical contributions pointing elsewhere (Krugman, Grossman,
Helpman, Lucas, etc.), key insights of the founding father of neo-classical
economics, Alfred Marshall, were also neglected. Alfred Marshall not only
describes taxes on diminishing returns activities in order to subsidize
increasing returns activities as a good development policy, he also empha-
sizes the importance for a nation to produce where most technical change
is found, and the role of synergies (industrial districts). These are the prin-
ciples behind all successful catching up since Henry VII started the indus-
trialization of England by taxing diminishing returns activities (an export tax
on raw wool) in order to subsidize industry manufacturing woolen cloth.
These elements, representing first successful practice and then sound the-
ory over more than 500 years, have disappeared from the policy space.    
15In the 1990s, as the world economy failed to deliver results corresponding
to the crudest version of Samuelson’s law of free trade, the search began
for other explanations. This search was, and still is, always based on the
premises of neo-classical economics, the search is for a factor which in
addition to neo-classical economics would set free the magic of the market
in providing factor-price equalization with instant global free trade:  
- ‘get the prices right’ 
- ‘get the property rights right’, 
- ‘get the institutions right’, 
- ‘get the governance right’, 
- ‘get the competitiveness right’
- ‘get the national innovation systems right’
- ‘get the entrepreneurship right’  
The vision of ‘the borderless economy’s potential to equalise relations
between countries and regions’ was based on the wrong theory. This the-
oretical fantasy developed into a practical nightmare in many poor coun-
tries. None of the sequential focuses on single issues will unleash a magic
of factor-price equalization under instant free trade, this never existed in his-
tory nor will it ever exist. Economic growth is by the very nature of things
an uneven process, and only wise political intervention can even out the
factor-price polarizations which are the natural results of an unrestrained
market. The latest fad in the sequence, attributing poverty to a lack of
entrepreneurship, comes across as being particularly uninformed. As con-
trasted to most people in the wealthy countries who can safely live within
their mostly routine jobs, the poor of the world have to prove their initia-
tives and entrepreneurship every day in order to ensure physical survival for
themselves and their families. 
The problem is that the sequence of theoretical fads for policy fails to
address the fundamental blind spots of neo-classical economics: a) its
inability to register qualitative differences, including the different potentials
of economic activities as carriers of economic growth, b) its inability to reg-
ister synergies and linkages
20, and c) its inability to cope with innovations
and novelties, and how differently these are distributed among economic
16
20 The slogan ‘get the national innovation systems right’ proves an exception, because it does refer
to a synergetic phenomenon. However, this does not lead very far because of the theory’s inability
to recognize the different windows of opportunity for innovation in Microsoft, under hugely increas-
ing returns, and in a goat herding firm in Mongolia, under critically diminishing returns. In standard
analysis Schumpeterian economics tends to be added like a thin icing on a thoroughly neoclassical
cake.activities. Together, these blind spots of present-day mainstream econom-
ics prevent many poor countries from developing. The successful ones, like
China and India, have, both for more than fifty years, followed the recom-
mendations of the Marshall Plan: creating a division of labour between
urban and rural activities. 
Learning is a key element in development, but learning may spread in the
economy also simply as falling prices to foreign consumers. The key insight
of Schumpeter’s student Hans Singer was that learning and technological
change in the production of raw materials, particularly in the absence of a
manufacturing sector, tend to lower export prices rather than to increase
the standard of living in the raw material producing nation.
21 Learning tends
to create wealth to producers only when they are part of that finely knit
network that was once called ‘industrialism’: a dynamic system of eco-
nomic activities subject to increasing productivity through technical change
and a large division of labour. The absence of increasing returns, dynamic
imperfect competition, and synergies in the raw material producing coun-
tries are all part of the mechanisms that perpetuate poverty. Part of the
explanation is also that only ‘industrialism’ gives the necessary critical mass
and political clout to create the countervailing power of labour unions. What
the French Regulation School economists call ‘fordism’, that workers’ pay
raises parallel to productivity improvements, was an important part of
industrialism.    
Further explorations along the mainstream route taken since 1990 are in my
view rapidly running into diminishing returns. Huge resources are employed
by well-intentioned governments along a largely sterile path of inquiry, a
main problem being that radically different alternative theoretical approach-
es are not financed or explored. In my opinion the only way to raise the stan-
dard of living in the poorest countries of the world is to follow the only suc-
cessful formula that ever worked, from England in 1485 to Europe and the
Asian Tigers in the 1960s and 70s and China today. The best social policy
is to create development, not by the rich creating subsidized reservations
where the poor are kept, largely underemployed and ‘underproductive’. The
Indian reservations in North America are sad examples of a policy of the kind
that subsidizes without changing productive structures. In short, the
Millennium Goals are in my view far too much biased towards palliative eco-
nomics rather than structural change, towards treating the symptoms of
poverty rather than its causes. I am not denying they could be an unavoid-
able emergency measure under the present critical conditions, but without
confronting the deeper roots of the problem it is simply poor social policy. 
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21 Singer, Hans W. ‘The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries’. 
In International Development: Growth and Change. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1964 (1950).Malaria was endemic to Europe for centuries, and the fight against this dis-
ease is documented since the times of the Roman Empire. Malaria was pres-
ent in areas where no one today would associate with the disease: Alpine
valleys as high as 1400 meters above sea level were infested with malaria
in the Middle Ages, and the disease has been found as far North as the Kola
peninsula in Northwestern Russia, beyond the polar circle. Europe got rid of
its malaria through industrialization and development. More advanced and
intensive agriculture caused swamps to be drained, and irrigation canals –
and even hydro-electric power plants – meant that the type of stagnating
water where malaria thrives was incompatible with economic development.
Huge public health works and eradication systems freed Europe from malar-
ia. The same type of development over time enabled European states to
honour the debts they contracted. 
In the place of this economic development that made Europe rich and malar-
ia-free, Africa gets to keep a colonial economic structure, exporting raw
materials with an underdeveloped industrial sector. Instead of development
enabling the continent to service debt, Africa gets debt cancellations.
Instead of development that eradicates malaria, Africa gets mosquito nets.
Africa’s problems are not addressed, just the symptoms of these problems.
This is just not good enough.      
Creating ‘welfare colonialism’.
Present policies run a risk of creating serious imbalances between the
efforts to create development and the palliative efforts of aid. What we may
be creating is a system that could be described as ‘welfare colonialism’.
This term was coined by anthropologist Robert Paine to describe the eco-
nomic integration of the native population in Northern Canada.
22 The essen-
tial features of welfare colonialism are: 1) The often observed colonial drain
of the old days is reversed, the net flow of funds is to the colony rather
than to the mother country, and 2) the native population is integrated in a
way that radically changes their previous livelihood, and 3) they are put on
the dole. 
In Paine’s view, welfare colonialism identifies welfare as the potential vehi-
cle for a stable internal ‘governing at a distance’ through the exercise of a
particularly subtle, ‘non-demonstrative’ and dependency-generating form of
neo-colonial social control that pre-empts local autonomy through ‘well-
intentioned’ and ‘generous’ – but ultimately ‘morally wrong’ – policies.
Welfare colonialism creates paralyzing dependencies on the ‘centre’ in a
peripheral population, a centre exerting control through incentives that cre-
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22  Paine, Robert (editor), The White Arctic. Anthropological Essays on Tutelage and Ethnicity,
Institute of Social and Economic Research,  Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977.ate total economic dependency, thus preventing political mobilization and
autonomy. The social conditions in which the native inhabitants of Arctic
North America find themselves today shows us that in their case the final
effect of massive transfer payments was to create a dystopia rather than a
utopia.    
We already see aid and transfers creating passivity and disincentives to
work in poor nations. My Haitian colleagues point to family transfer pay-
ments from the United States creating disincentives to work for a going rate
of 30 US cents an hour in Haiti. A Brazilian research project on the highly
laudable Zero Hunger project, carried out at different government levels
(national, state and local) on different programs targeted to fight hunger,
concludes that to a large extent these projects are ineffective, since they
treat symptoms of poverty either by distributing food or by subsidizing food
prices, rather than creating situations where the poor are converted into
breadwinners.
23 These are welfare colonialism type effects: results of treat-
ing the symptoms rather than the causes of poverty.     
The idea of nations producing under increasing returns (industrialized
nations) paying an annual compensation to nations producing under con-
stant or diminishing returns (raw material producers) is not a new one. It is
a logical conclusion from standard trade theory once both increasing, con-
stant, and diminishing returns are included, and this recommendation – a
forerunner of the Millennium Strategy – is present already in a US college
textbook from the 1970s.
24 Until very recently, however, the favored
option was to industrialize the poor countries, even if it meant that for a
long time these industries would not be competitive on the world market.
Making free trade the linchpin of the world economic system – one to
which all other considerations must yield – has made a type of welfare colo-
nialism appear as the only option. We must compensate the poor for the
welfare loss from free trade, seems to be the underlying idea. The other
option, to develop the poor world, is not there because we do not wish to
abolish free trade as the core of the world economic order. However, the
long term and cumulative effects of having groups of nations specializing in
pre-industrial economic structures will be staggering. In my view the poli-
cies successfully followed between 1485 and the 1960s are – in spite of
their being decidedly out of fashion – still the better alternative.
19
23 Lavinas L and Garcia E. (2004) Programas Sociais de Combate à Fome. O legado dos anos de
estabilização econômica,.Rio de Janeiro, editora UFRJ/IPEA, Coleção Economia e Sociedade, 2004.
24 ‘Thus the country which eventually specializes completely in the production of X (that is, the com-
modity whose production function is characterized by increasing returns to scale) might agree to
make an income transfer (annually) to the other country, which agrees to specialize completely in Y
(that is, the commodity whose production function is characterized by constant returns to scale’
(Chacholiades, Miltiades, International Trade Theory and Policy, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1978, p.
199; see also Reinert 1980).Both after 1848 – in order to solve the perennial ‘social question’ in Europe
– and in 1947, political pressure from the spectre of communism unleashed
successful development practices. Few are aware that Karl Marx stated
that the only reason he was in favour of free trade was that it hastened the
revolution. In 1947, the free traders in Washington had to yield to the polit-
ical need for protectionist development policy around the communist block.
This Marshall Plan was a truly astonishing success. It is perhaps a faint
hope that today’s terrorist threat will unleash a similar situation where free
trade is temporarily abandoned in order to create development as a politi-
cal, rather than as a social, goal.     
During the Enlightenment civilization and democracy were understood,
through the analysis of people like Montesquieu and his contemporaries, as
products of a specific type of economic structure. We find the origins of
this understanding already in Francis Bacon more than 100 years earlier: 
‘There is a startling difference between the life of men in the most civilised
province of Europe, and in the wildest and most barbarous districts of New
India. This difference comes not from the soil, not from climate, not from
race, but from the arts.’
25 When German economist Johan Jacob Meyen in
1770 stated ‘It is known that a primitive people does not improve their cus-
toms and institutions, later to find useful industries, but the other way
around’, he expressed something which could be considered common
sense at the time. We find the same idea – that civilisation is crated by
industrialisation – in the 19th century in thinkers across the whole political
spectrum from Abraham Lincoln to Karl Marx. Industrialisation ‘draws all,
even the most barbarian, nations into civilization’ as Marx puts it.    
We ought to use our understanding of successful policies in past history,
which is the only laboratory economics has, in order to create something
brand new and adequate for solving today’s challenges. We should attempt
to create something as brilliant and practical as did the visions and accom-
panying policy recommendations of Alexander Hamilton and Abraham
Lincoln, but firmly grounded in an understanding of the present technolog-
ical and historical context.
We ought to be as enlightened again in understanding the connection
between production and civilization, by moving our theoretical focus away
from trade and on to production. Compared to Meyen’s statement above,
our present understanding has reversed the arrows of causality, and we
therefore risk creating an increasing number of failed states. We now ought
to focus on how differently technological development hits different eco-
nomic activities, creating huge variations in the windows of opportunity to
20
25 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, 1620.innovate, and how this makes it possible for nations to specialize in being
poor and uneducated. We should focus more on core issues like economies
of scale, scope, speed and specialization, on avoiding the negative effects
of diminishing returns and lock-in effects, on the assimilation of knowledge
rather than the accumulation of capital, on changing the economic struc-
tures of poor countries so they become more like those of the rich ones.
We should read not only Schumpeter on technical change, but also
Schumpeter’s essay on imperialism. Read not only Schumpeter on ‘creative
destruction’, but also open our eyes and minds to the type of ‘destructive
destruction’ that can be observed. 
The Present Problems of Europe as a Reflection of the Problems of
Globalization.
As already mentioned, our present collective failure to understand why so
many countries stay poor is intimately tied to a number of blind spots on
the retina of standard economics. These blind spots make it extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to create a theory of uneven economic develop-
ment. As Lionel Robbins warned us more than 50 years ago, the basic fea-
tures of the neoclassical paradigm produces a Harmonielehre, a theory –
one might add – where economic harmony is already built into the assump-
tions on which the theory rests. Today, this paradigm hinders rather than
helps our understanding of the reasons behind poverty. As Thomas Kuhn
says, ‘A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from
those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form,
because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental
tools the paradigm supplies.’
26 
Any long-term solution for Africa and for other poor areas will have to rest
on a theory of uneven development – a theory which addresses these blind
spots of economics which obfuscate our collective view.  Such a theory
once existed at a level complete enough to create successful economic pol-
icy for 500 years – from Henry VII’s England in 1485 to the integration of
Spain and Portugal into the European Union in 1986 – but is now virtually
extinct in any faculty of economics. Although a complete outline of this
theory and of the accompanying policy measures lies beyond the scope and
possibilities of a paper like this, I shall refer to some core elements of this
theory and the accompanying policy measures in this section. 
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26 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 37.Today’s approach towards the poor world suffers from two main defects.
First, as we have already emphasized, the balance is extremely tilted
towards palliative economics, to ease the pains of poverty rather than to
eradicate poverty permanently through economic development. Secondly,
today’s approach makes it possible to continue and even extend (as in the
WTO negotiations) present practice without investigating what went so
wrong with globalization in the periphery. Palliative rather than curative
measures – debt cancellation and Millennium Goals – make it possible for
the world economic order to continue to be based on the theory that cre-
ated the problems in the first place. The same myths based on ideology
rather than on experience, the same policies, and the same people that cre-
ated the problems are still in charge. To use a medical metaphor: we are
giving the patients – the poor countries – blood transfusions in terms of
cash and debt relief without having asked the basic question as to why the
loss of blood occurs in the first place. It has been a key mistake to keep the
same people in power who brought in neoclassical shock therapy, the
measures responsible for much of the problems. This way of operating vir-
tually guarantees that we do not face the quite fundamental discussion of
what went wrong. By naming Attila the Hun as the Minister of Roman
Reconstruction we have prevented any discussion of past destruction.
What is needed is a theory that explains why economic development, in its
very nature, is such an uneven process. Only then can the appropriate pol-
icy measures be put in place. 
The problem created by today’s economic theory, where the market is seen
as a harmony-creating machinery, is not limited to the Third World. In the
case of the European Union, the alternative experienced-based theory – that
I refer to as The Other Canon – was kept alive much longer in Europe’s own
policy than in Europe’s approach towards the Third World. At the national
level, most – if not all – developed nations experience increasing econom-
ic inequalities internally. The same type of problems is thus experienced on
three levels: Globally, with the European Union, and within most developed
nations. The basic causes behind these developments are the same: old the-
ories that worked for centuries have been abandoned.  
Tensions with the European Community that resulted in votes of no to the
European Constitution are results of the same economic forces that create
poverty in the world periphery. People in the old member states in the
European Union feel betrayed because their welfare is being eroded, while
people in the new member states feel betrayed because welfare is not arriv-
ing as fast as expected. Not unexpectedly, this completely new and unex-
pected situation causes people to ask in the same way as they ask about
globalization: what went wrong? 
22German economist Friedrich List (1789-1846) is no hero in today’s eco-
nomics textbooks, but it was his economic principles that not only indus-
trialized Continental Europe in the 19th century, but also built European inte-
gration from the early 1950s until and including the successful integration
of Spain and Portugal into the EU in 1986. For a long time the division of
labour in Europe was clear, Friedrich List ruled the field of practical policy,
while neo-classical economics ruled in the economics textbooks. Not until
the 2004 integration of 10 new countries were List’s principles abandoned
in favour of the same textbook economics that dominates the Washington
Consensus. The result was increasing unemployment and poverty in the old
core countries inflaming the debate that produced the ‘no’ to the constitu-
tion.
27     
Below are three of List’s key principles – they are in reality much older –
contrasted with standard textbook economics. In order to develop Africa
and other poor countries, the present neoclassical economic principles must
be abandoned in favour of the old Listian principles.  
Listian principle: A nation first industrialises and is then gradually 
integrated eco-nomically into nations at the same level of develop-
ment.  
Neoclassical principle: Free trade is a goal per se, even before the 
required stage of industrialisation is achieved. The 2004 EU enlarge
ment went directly against Listian principles. First the former com-
munist countries in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Hungary)
suffered dramatic deindustrialisation, unemployment and underem-
ployment. These countries were then abruptly integrated into the 
EU, creating enormous economic and social tensions. From the 
point of view of Western Europe, the factor price equalisation pro-
mised by international trade theory proved to be an equalisation 
downward.
Listian principle: The preconditions for wealth, democracy and poli-
tical freedom are all the same: a diversified manufacturing sector 
subject to increasing returns
28 (which would historically mean man-
ufacturing, but also includes knowledge-intensive service sector). 
This was the principle upon which the United States economy was
built, this was the principle promoted by the first US Secretary of 
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27 This negative development in Europe is discussed in Reinert, Erik S. and Rainer Kattel ‘The
Qualitative Shift in European Integration: Towards Permanent Wage Pressures and a ‘Latin-
Americanization’ of Europe?’, Praxis Working Paper no. 17, Praxis Foundation, Estonia
http://www.praxis.ee/data/WP_17_2004.pdf.
28 The works of Jane Jacobs on the role of the cities arrive at the same conclusion as List from a
different starting point. the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton
29, and this same principle was 
rediscovered by George Marshall in 1947 and quoted above.
Neoclassical principle: all economic activities are qualitatively alike,
so it does not  matter what you produce. Ideology based on ‘com-
parative advantage’ without an understanding that it is actually pos-
sible for a nation to specialise in being poor and ignorant, in eco-
nomic activities that require little knowledge, operate under perfect
competition and diminishing returns, and/or bereft of any scale 
economies and technological change.   
Listian principle: Economic welfare a result of synergy. Already in 
the 13th century Florentine Chancellor Brunetto Latini (1210-1294) 
explains the wealth of cities as a common weal (‘un ben comune’).
30 
Neoclassical principle: ‘There is no such thing as society’, Margaret
Thatcher (1987).
Just as Kuhn describes above, these Listian principles cannot be captured
by the tools of the ruling economic paradigm. Understanding List requires
understanding qualitative differences between economic activities, diversi-
ty, innovations, synergies and historical sequencing of processes. These are
all blind spots in standard economics, especially in their interacting and
cumulative totality. 
Working with economic tools subject to the blind spots that prevent them
from seeing List’s points – traditionally seen as part of economics – today’s
standard economists grope for explanations of continued poverty outside
their own profession. They return to factors that have been studied and dis-
carded before by the economics profession, like race and climate, and
refuse to see that all historical experience tells us that the economic struc-
ture of wealthy countries all have certain characteristics that poor nations
lack (increasing returns, innovations, diversity, synergies). The collapse of
the first wave of globalisation led economists into eugenics or racial
hygiene
31. Africans were not seen as poor because of the colonial economic
structure that had been imposed on the continent; Africans were poor
because they were black. During a more enlightened era 400 years ago,
Francis Bacon discarded race as a factor explaining wealth and poverty (see
above). Today the marginally more politically correct version of this type of
theory is that Africa is poor because blacks are corrupt. 
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29 In his 1791 Report on the Subject of Manufactures. 
30 These issues are discussed in Reinert, Erik S., ‘The Role of the State in Economic Growth.’,
Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 26, No. 4/5, 1999. 
31 Irving Fischer was both the leading economist and the leader of the eugenics movement in the
United States in this period. For a discussion see Ross, Eric, The Malthus Factor: Poverty, Politics
and Population in Capitalist Development, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998Diversity as a precondition for development. 
Another blind spot of economics is its inability to register the importance of
diversity for economic growth. Diversity is a key factor in development of
a variety of reasons. First of all, a diversity of increasing returns activities –
maximising the number of professions in an economy – is the basis for the
synergy effects that we call economic development. This was the standard
understanding starting in the 1600s
32. Secondly, modern evolutionary eco-
nomics points to the importance of diversity as basis for the selection
process between technologies, between products and between organisa-
tional solutions which are all key elements in an evolving market econo-
my
33. Thirdly, diversity has been pointed out as the one important expla-
nation for European ‘exceptionalism’ was that the large number of nation-
states in competition with each other created tolerance and demand for
diversity. A scholar whose views were not popular with the king or ruler,
could easily find employment in a different nation. This created a huge
diversity of ideas and approaches, leading to the desirable situation
described under the second point above.  
A forth and interesting point on diversity – regarding the contentious issue
of religion – is emphasised by Johann Friedrich von Pfeiffer (1718-1787),
one of the most influential German economists of the 18th century. While
some economists have seen economic growth promoted by some religions
rather than others
34, Richard Tawney, a famous English historian, empha-
sised the declining importance of religion as propelling capitalism
35. 150
years earlier Pfeiffer argued that when a diversity of ‘competing’ religions
exists within state, religion as an institution will lose much of its power over
the inhabitants. The existence of alternatives will remove the fear and other
factors that create fanaticism, and the new tolerance will open up for a
desired diversity of population and skills.
36 This will of course, in turn, lead
to what Tawney points to above, and may in fact be a key economic result
of the European Reformation.   
Today we live in an age of great ignorance, when long recognised qualita-
tive arguments exploring the process of economic development have been
lost. The importance of diversity is just one. The banality of today’s ruling
explanations of poverty being a result of climate and corruption amply tes-
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32 See Reinert (2004) above.
33  See Nelson, Richard R. & Sydney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change,
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1982. 
34 Werner Sombart emphasised the role of Judaism, Max Weber the role of Protestantism. 
35 Tawney, Richard, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. A Historical Study, London, J. Murray,
1926. 
36 (Pfeiffer, Johann Friedrich von), Vermischte Verbesserungsvorschläge und freie Gedanken, Vol.
2, Frankfurt, Esslinger, 1778.tifies to this ignorance, an ignorance fortified by an absence of historical
knowledge and of any interest in the proven principles that have brought
nation after nation from wealth to poverty over a period of 500 years. As
Paul Krugman has pointed out, previous economic insights tend to get lost,
only to be rediscovered later. In a similar situation to the one we are in now,
an enlightened group of 19th century German economists caught the ear of
Chancellor Bismarck, and were allowed to design the welfare state.
Similarly, not long ago, just after World War II, the world understood that
economic development was a result of synergies and increasing returns.
Combined with the political threat of communism, this understanding made
it possible to overrule the free-trade ideologies in Washington and industri-
alise or re-industrialise Europe and industrialize parts of Asia. In order to re-
start growth, it is necessary to re-invent this type of economic theory.  
Policy implications: Aiming for increasing returns, diversity and the 
common weal.
From an economic point of view, the poor populations in the world periph-
ery may be seen from two different angles: either in terms of consumption
or in terms of production. From the consumption point of view we are faced
with about 2 billion people whose extremely low purchasing power causes
them to live near the brink of famine and disease. A normal gut reaction is
to give them more purchasing power through aid. This is the gut reaction
that has created the Millennium Goals and traditional development assis-
tance. Since many of the victims of poverty are farmers, another normal gut
reaction is – in isolation – to attempt to make their farming more efficient. 
However, these gut reactions go squarely against 500 years’ experience of
successful development policy. Only the presence of manufacturing indus-
try produces efficient agriculture. As David Hume says in his 1767 History
of England – discussing the reign of the already frequently mentioned Henry
VII (1485) – ‘Promoting husbandry ... is never more effectually encouraged
than by the increase of manufactures’
37. The conscious creation of such
synergies and the economic diversity that makes them possible has been a
mandatory passage point for all nations going from poor to wealthy since
the late 1400s.
38 However, as already mentioned, synergies are one of
several factors to which today’s standard economic theory is blind. 
Looking at poverty in the world periphery from a production point of view,
incorporating the insights from Henry VII via David Hume to George
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from a huge underutilization of resources, with around 2 billion people who
are severely underemployed or unemployed, engaged in economic activities
that are far from ‘efficient’. In the eyes of old-fashioned neo-classical eco-
nomics, we see nations that are operating very far from their production
possibility frontier, with many resources underutilized. This is the perspec-
tive from the world shaken by the Great Depression of the 1930s, the per-
spective of the original Bretton Woods agreement as it was implemented
during the first decades after World War II. This was the logic of the
Marshall Plan: to protect and create industrialization, diversity and increas-
ing returns activities in all nations involved. The post-war interpretation of
poverty included assigning a social cost to the underutilization of resources,
e.g. unemployment. These could be measured using shadow prices, and the
result was to justify temporary protection in order to achieve both full
employment and a diversified industrial structure. Today the Washington
Consensus uses models assuming full employment, and implicitly assigns
no social or other cost to the fact that human resources in the Third World
are hugely underemployed. Seeing palliative economics as the only solution
is a natural consequence of this view.  
To an expanding world economy where many raw materials are becoming
strategic commodities, the poor in many ways ‘stand in the way’ of the
access to these raw materials. The situation is not unlike the American
Indians being a hindrance to the settlers’ use of land: today’s poor stand in
the way of our use of their resources. Among US conservatives placing the
poor in ‘reservations’ is still an option under consideration. Only 10 years
ago, in a much publicized book, two American authors recommend estab-
lishing a custodial state: ‘by custodial state, we have in mind a high-tech
and more lavish version of the Indian reservation for some substantial
minority of the nation’s population, while the rest of America tries to go
about its business’
39 The Millennium Goals are uncomfortably close to com-
bining the view of poverty from the consumption side with the idea of
establishing reservations where the basic needs of poor people are taken
care while the rest of the world get along with their business.  
As in the original Bretton Woods agreement as it was practiced in Europe
after World War II, unemployment and underemployment justify the pro-
tection of national economies until full employment has been reached.
Likewise, a national plan – as e.g. to industrialise a country – justifies spe-
cial measures under the original Bretton Woods. This will mean that we –
as Europe did after World War II – must temporarily let the principle of free
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In short, the conditionalities of the Washington Institutions must be brought
in line with Bretton Woods as it was originally interpreted.
In order to implement this policy, today’s economics has to revert to old
common sense in two aspects that are closely related. First, we shall have
to bring back the understanding that the process of catching-up for very
poor countries involves a trade-off between the interests of man-the-pro-
ducer and man-the-consumer. Secondly, we shall have to bring back the
understanding that static absolute efficiency may differ considerably from
long-term income-maximizing efficiency. As Paul Samuelson said on the
effects of globalization in a recent interview: ‘You need more temporary
protection for the losers. My belief is that every good cause is worth some
inefficiency’.
40
At the point in time when England had industrialized as the only nation on
the planet, any consideration of static efficiency meant that no other nation
ought to follow her path to industrialization. All the nations that followed
England’s path to wealth only did so by sacrificing static efficiency in order
to achieve a higher long-term dynamic efficiency. Industrializing the United
States through targeting and protecting certain industries was just as stat-
ically inefficient then as protecting Africa’s industries is today. The very
rapid increase in real wages after the boycotts of the United States (under
the Napoleonic Wars), and more recently of South Africa and Rhodesia tes-
tifies to the beneficial effects of protectionism even when it is imposed from
the outside. It is, however, important to keep in mind that – contrary to so
many Latin American countries after World War II – it is essential to com-
bine competition with national or regional competition. Appendix II estab-
lishes guidelines for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protection based on historical experi-
ence. 
In the poorest periphery, targeting economic diversity will have to start in
economic activities that already exist. In the spirit of the original and
Keynesian version of the Washington Institutions, one starting point in order
to increase real employment could be to see where the smallest tariff would
achieve the maximum economic result in terms of employment and nation-
al value added, while minimizing the profitability of smuggling. An example:
Many poor countries import large quantities of poultry from developed
countries. A small tariff on poultry could easily create much more employ-
ment and value added than the cost of the tariff. It should be kept in mind
that for poor countries tariffs have always played the dual role of produc-
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ing revenues and producing more productive economic structures. In weak
states, ports were often the only piece of territory under full control by the
government, and tariffs became the easiest revenue to collect. 
Free trade among nations at the same level of development is always ben-
eficial. Therefore regional integration is a key to development. However, the
problem tends to be that poor neighboring countries have little to sell to
each other. Today Africa is being separated into trading spheres much as it
was carved up into colonial interest spheres in the Berlin Conference in
1884-1885. In Africa the pressures of the United States and the European
Union prevent policies that create industrialization under local competition,
adding up with the so-called spaghetti bowl of regional integration schemes
(SACU; SADC; COMESA; EAC) with all their cross-membership among
these countries, to make development very difficult. The developed coun-
tries’ pressures to export break up rather than enforce the Listian principle
of regional integration that must precede any successful globalization. The
European Union presses for market access for their apples in Egypt, thus
destroying the centenary tradition of Egypt buying apples from Lebanon.
The present carving up of Africa into different economic spheres is exactly
the opposite of what Africa needs: a better economic integration within
Africa before – when a certain degree of development has been achieved
– opening up for globalization.  
The kind of economic policy that creates development in Africa will not take
place until the entire structure of present economic theory has been demol-
ished. The unifying characteristic of the 50 poorest countries in the world
today is an almost total absence of manufacturing industries. The key
insight that having an inefficient manufacturing sector produces a higher
standard of living than having no manufacturing sector at all will have to be
recovered. If we do not regain this insight, the global economy will forever
fail to produce nations with a middle level of income. Only this insight can
stop the parallel race to the bottom in the spheres of both democracy and
economic welfare. Part of this insight – common knowledge in the 18th cen-
tury – is that democracies were a product of a diversified economic struc-
ture, not the other way around.   
UNIDO has already given much thought to methods for industrialising poor
countries. During the last two decades the skills and experience of UNIDO
and other UN institutions like UNCTAD; UNDP, ILO, ECLAC/CEPAL,
UNRISD and UNICEF have been overshadowed by the aggressiveness of
the Washington Institutions. The UN institutions have virtually been bullied
into silence. The political turbulence around UNDPs 2003 report ‘Making
Global Trade Work for People’ testifies to this process. The report –
financed by US foundations – was at the point of having to be withdrawnbecause of political pressure, and it was only saved through the interfer-
ence of the same US foundations. It is indeed time that the UN agencies –
where so much relevant knowledge rests – start working together in a more
coordinated way in order to be heard.           
This is the time to recall and finally listen to Nobel Economics Laureate
Gunnar Myrdal’s advice, written in 1956, to Third World leaders on the sub-
ject of economic theory:
‘They should be aware of the fact that very much of these theories
are partly rationalisations of the dominant interest in the advanced
and rapidly progressing industrial countries…it…would be pathetic 
if the young social scientists of the under-developed countries got 
caught in the predilections of he thinking in the advanced countries,
which are hampering the scholars there in their efforts to be ratio-
nal but would be almost deadening to the intellectual strivings of 
those in the under-developed countries. I would instead wish them
to have the courage to throw away large structures of meaningless,
irrelevant and sometimes blatantly inadequate doctrines and theo-
retical approaches and to start out from fresh thinking right from 
their needs and their problems. This would then take them far bey-
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77. Appendix 1
‘Mercantilist’ Economic Policies of the Generic Developmental State.
Continuity of policy measures and tool kit from England in 1485 (Henry
VII) to Korea in the 1960’s: a mandatory passage point for economic
development.
…the fundamental things apply, as time goes by.
Sam, the pianist, in ‘Casablanca’.
1. Observation of wealth synergies clustered around increasing returns activities
and continuous mechanization in general. Recognition that ‘We are in the wrong
business’. Conscious targeting, support and protection of these increasing returns
activities.
2. Temporary monopolies/patents/protection given to targeted activities in a cer-
tain geographical area.
3. Recognizing development as a synergetic phenomenon, and consequently the
need for a diversified manufacturing sector (‘maximizing the division of labor’, Serra
1613 + observations of the Dutch Republic and Venice)
4. Empirical evidence accumulated showed that the manufacturing sector solves
three policy problems endemic to the Third World in one go: increasing national
added value (GDP), increasing employment, and solving balance of payment prob-
lems.  
5. Attraction of foreigners to work in the targeted activities (historically religious
prosecutions have been important)
6. Relative suppression of landed nobility (from Henry VII to Korea). (Physiocracy
as a landowners’ rebellion against this policy)
7. Tax breaks for targeted activities.
8. Cheap credits for targeted activities.
9. Export bounties for targeted activities.
10. Strong support for agricultural sector, in spite of this sector clearly being
seen as incapable of independently bringing the nation out of poverty.  
11. Emphasis on learning/education (UK apprentice system under Elizabeth I,
Child  (1693)
12. Patent protection for valuable knowledge (Venice from 1490s)
13. Frequent export tax/export ban on raw materials in order to make raw mate-
rials more expensive to competing nations (starting with Henry VII in late 1400s,
whose policy was very efficient in severely damaging the woolen industry in Medici
Florence).
Source: Reinert E. & S. ‘Mercantilism and Economic Development: Schumpeterian
Dynamics, Institution Building and International Benchmarking’, in Jomo, K. S. and
Erik S. Reinert (editors), Origins of Economic Development, London, Zed Publica-
tions, forthcoming 2005.
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Good ‘East Asian’ 
Protectionism 
Temporary protection of new 
industries/products 
for the world market
Consequently very steep learning curves
compared to the rest of the world
Based on a dynamic Schumpeterian
view of the world – market-driven 
‘creative destruction’
Domestic competition maintained
Core technology locally controlled
Massive investment in education / 
industrial policy which created a huge
demand for education
Meritocracy – capital, jobs and 
privileges distributed according
to qualifications
Equality of land distribution (Korea)
Even income distribution increased
home market for advanced industrial
goods
Profits created through dynamic
‘Schumpeterian’ rent-seeking
Intense cooperation between producers
and local suppliers
Regulation of technology transfer 
oriented towards maximizing 
knowledge transferred
Bad ‘Latin American’ 
Protectionism
Permanent protection of mature 
industries/products for the home market
(often very small)
Learning consequently lagging 
compared to the rest of the world
Based on a more ‘static’ view of the
world – planning economy
Little domestic competition
Core technology generally imported
from abroad / assembly of imported
parts / ‘superficial’ industrialization
Less emphasis on education /
type of industries created did not lead
to the East Asian demand for education
Nepotismo in the distribution of capital, 
jobs and privileges
Mixed record on land distribution
Uneven income distribution restricted
scale of home market and decreased
competitiveness of local industry
Profits created through 
static rent-seeking
Confrontation between producers and
local suppliers
Regulation of technology transfer 
oriented towards avoiding ‘traps’
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Figure 1. Peru 1960-1990: Diverging Paths of Real Wages and Exports.
Sources: Real Wages: Roca, Santiago & Luis Simabuco, ‘Natural Resources,
Industrialisation and Fluctuating Standards of Living in Peru, 1950–1997: A Case Study of
Activity-Specific Economic Growth’, in Reinert, Erik S., Globalization, Economic
Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004.
Exports: Webb, Richard & Graciela Fernández Baca, Perú en Números, Lima, Instituto
Cuanto, 2001.
NB. The export figures in this draft are, provisionally, in current US dollars, which exaggerates
the visual effect.  34
Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics 
The Other Canon Foundation, Norway, and the Technology Governance
program at Tallinn University of Technology (TUT), Estonia, have launched
a new working papers series, entitled “Working Papers in Technology
Governance and Economic Dynamics”.  In the context denoted by the title
series, it will publish original research papers, both practical and theoretical,
both narrative and analytical, in the area denoted by such concepts as
uneven economic growth, techno-economic paradigms, the history and the-
ory of economic policy, innovation strategies, and the public management
of innovation, but also generally in the wider fields of industrial policy,
development, technology, institutions, finance, public policy, and econom-
ic and financial history and theory.
The idea is to offer a venue for quickly presenting interesting papers –
scholarly articles, especially as preprints, lectures, essays in a form that
may be developed further later on – in a high-quality, nicely formatted ver-
sion, free of charge: all working papers are downloadable for free from
http://hum.ttu.ee/tg as soon as they appear, and you may also order a free
subscription by e-mail attachment directly from the same website.
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